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Abstract 
 
In order to understand, how, why and whether the trade-offs and tensions around simultaneous 
implementation of the SDGs are resolved in ways which are both sustainable and equitable 
requires an appreciation of power relations across multiple scales of governance. We explore 
the politics and political economy of how the nexus around food-energy and water is being 
governed through initiatives to promote ‘climate-smart agriculture’ (CSA) as it moves from 
the global to the local. We combine analysis of how these interrelationships are being governed 
(and ungoverned) by key global institutions with reflection upon the consequences of this for 
developing countries that are being targeted by CSA initiatives. In particular, we look at Kenya 
as a country heavily dependent on agriculture, but also subject to some of the worst effects of 
climate change, and which has been targeted by a range of bilateral and multilateral donors 
with their preferred vision of CSA. We draw on strands of literature in global environmental 
politics (GEPs), political ecology and the political economy of development to make sense of 
the power dynamics which characterize the multi-scalar politics of how CSA is translated, 
domesticated and operationalized in practice.  
 
Introduction 
 
We currently lack global governance institutions and processes in the area of food and 
agriculture capable of addressing the interrelationships between the global food system on the 
one hand, and environmental challenges around water, energy and climate change on the other. 
Instead, fragmentation persists across institutions and agencies with responsibility for these 
areas, despite the growing acknowledgement of the complex interlinkages that characterize the 
nexus around water, energy and food (WEF) in particular. The urgency of addressing these 
issues is underscored by the recognition that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
cannot be achieved in isolation from one another. To simultaneously and effectively achieve 
goals 2 (hunger), 6 (water), 7 (energy), 13 (climate change) and 15 (life on land) presupposes 
an institutional capacity and willingness to act on and govern those relationships in more 
integrated ways across all levels of governance from the local to the global, crossing scales and 
sectors (UNEP 2007).  
 
In order to understand, how, why and whether the trade-offs and tensions around simultaneous 
implementation of the SDGs are resolved in ways which are both sustainable and equitable 
requires, we argue, an appreciation of power relations across scales of governance and their 
interaction. We document these relations of power and suggest analytical tools for 
comprehending them. We focus upon how the nexus around WEF is being governed through 
initiatives and policies to promote climate-smart agriculture which hold the promise of ‘triple 
wins’ by simultaneously increasing productivity, lowering greenhouse gas emissions and 
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enabling a more climate resilient agricultural sector. The increasingly powerful discourse of 
CSA draws attention to the interdependence of food and agriculture with the climate system. 
Yet beyond technical ‘fixes’, it provides few clues about how to effectively address the 
integrated and inter-sectoral focus which the SDGs require. This presents huge challenges for 
local, national and global governance systems accustomed to dealing with these issues in 
isolation, rather than addressing the ways in which they impact upon one another. It generates 
challenges in terms of moving from the horizontal governance of fragmented and siloed 
sectoral decision-making, to ecological governance where decision-making has to anticipate 
and take account of ecosystemic interconnections and reconcile the multiple resource 
dependencies implied by particular policy pathways. But it also generates challenges in terms 
of vertical governance and what we refer to in this paper as the ‘triple disconnect’ between the 
global, national and local scales as the trade-offs inherent in dealing with the political and 
ecological connections between goals are negotiated across levels of authority. Thus, despite 
an international policy arena saturated with rhetoric around integration, political discussion of 
how these trade-offs are handled in practice has been lacking. As Rai and Fisher observe; 
‘Further research is needed into the role of national and local politics in climate change 
responses in LDCs, and in particular how the mitigation, adaptation and development agendas 
can be brought together in these contexts’ (2016, 7).  
 
This paper combines analysis of how these interrelationships are being governed by global 
institutions such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank with 
reflection upon the consequences of this for developing countries that are being targeted by 
particular CSA initiatives. To illustrate these dynamics we explore the case of Kenya, which 
has been targeted by a range of bilateral and multilateral donors with their preferred vision of 
CSA. The research is informed by semi-structured interviews in Kenya, direct participation in 
the development of the national CSA strategy, participant observation in side-events at the 
‘action for agriculture CoP’ [Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change] (CTA 2016) in Marrakech in 2016 and discussions and 
personal communications with key global actors in CSA initiatives. 
 
Our approach invites questions about how, why and for whom CSA is being governed as it 
moves across scales, as well as reflection upon the implications of this for more sustainable 
pathways and inclusive responses to the challenges of promoting food security in a warming 
world. We show how different outcomes are produced once refracted through intra and trans-
state negotiations over how to manage the trade-offs and conflicts implied by realigning 
different agricultural development pathways in response to the threat of climate change. In 
empirical terms, we  make a contribution to emerging literatures on the SDGs and the politics 
of their implementation, as well as to debates about CSA by looking at a case of their 
implementation in a context in which they have yet to be studied in this way. 
 
We suggest that the language of synergy and integration around the SDG objectives belies the 
reality of both institutional jockeying for position between global governance institutions at the 
international level, among government departments at national level, and between national and 
local government actors that seek to position themselves to benefit from new resource flows 
associated with climate finance and the SDGs, which tends to reproduce siloed policy practices. 
In relation to CSA, discourses of synergy and triple-wins frame the issue as one of better 
understanding the links between interrelated environmental challenges and optimizing policy, 
which serves to downplay the conflicts between competing policy objectives. This obscures 
the contradictions and tensions, in ecological and social terms in particular, of pursuing these 
goals in tandem and results in these challenges being passed down to local government and 
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project level for their resolution. In relation to CSA, this manifests itself in the prior 
commitment to an export-led model of industrial agriculture without taking seriously whether 
the water, land and energy inputs required to sustain such a model are compatible with the 
climate objectives of decarbonizing the global economy, securing land tenure or improving 
access to water. Instead, we show that interventions from donors and Multilateral Development 
Banks (MDBs) and regional initiatives such as the Comprehensive African Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP) in Africa serve to lock in and entrench a private and 
market-led model of agricultural development which has the potential to impinge negatively 
upon the achievement of SDG goals around improved access to water and energy for the poor 
and security of land tenure.  
 
But the process we describe is not a one-way, top-down imposition of a particular (neoliberal) 
approach to CSA, as demonstrated by the discussion of CSA implementation in Kenya. 
Competition between agencies, differing interests and the very ambiguity of CSA, which 
allows corporate and global governance actors to label diverse technologies as ‘climate-smart’ 
(Newell and Taylor 2017; Taylor 2017), also creates opportunities for national and local 
government officials to acquire authority and resources by invoking the label ‘climate-smart’. 
In other words, across governance scales a series of accommodations and negotiations take 
place where global and regional imperatives are brought into play with local political dynamics 
which assert their preferred readings of CSA and the policy approaches and technologies by 
which it can best be achieved.  
 
Theorizing the Governance and Un-governance of Food and Agriculture in a Warming 
World 
 
How can we best account for the governance of CSA across scales? Firstly, in terms of the 
horizontal governance of the interface between climate change and the food system among 
global governance institutions, in the next section we describe and analyze how a ‘regime 
complex’ around food, agriculture and climate change contributes to the formation of a 
‘discourse coalition’ organized around a dominant interpretation of CSA, despite deep 
ambiguities around the substance of CSA approaches. Here, regime complexes refer to loosely 
coupled sets of regimes involving actors, institutions and networks, public and private, which 
govern in particular issue areas. This allows for the tracing of the relationships and dynamics 
between actors within the complex. Analyses of such complexes have been produced for 
genetic resources (Raustiala and Victor, 2004), food security (Margulis 2013) and climate 
change (Keohane and Victor 2011) as well as for the institutions within the climate change, 
food and agriculture arena under the banner of climate-smart agriculture (Newell and Taylor 
2017).  
 
However, in order to understand how trade-offs around food, land, water and energy are 
managed, it is necessary to draw on critical accounts of power in global governance (Clapp and 
Fuchs 2009; Barnett and Duvall 2005) which seek to explore why some institutions prevail 
over others. This provides us with a point of departure for understanding the ‘horizontal’ flows 
of power between global governance institutions and the inequities and imbalances between 
them. For example, why some framings of CSA predominate over others and how and why 
global institutions engage with CSA in order to enhance their profile, legitimacy and to secure 
new revenue streams. Discursive approaches would draw attention to the existence of a 
discourse coalition around CSA at the global level, defined as ‘the ensemble of a set of story 
lines, the actors that utters these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, 
all organized around a discourse’ (Hajer 1997, 47). But it is still necessary to account for the 
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material power of those actors part of the discourse coalition around CSA in order to understand 
why the preferred framings of more powerful actors predominate.   
 
To explain why certain framings and ideologies with regard to the nature of the crisis prevail 
over others requires a deeper and more multidimensional reading of power, including its 
structural elements, than is afforded by liberal institutionalist analysis of regimes (Strange 
1983). Literatures on ‘food regimes’ provide useful insights in this regard (Friedmann 2016; 
McMichael 2016), locating the governance of food and agriculture within broader historical 
cycles in the organization of the global capitalist economy (McMichael 2009). This helps to 
explain the current dominance of a ‘market liberal’ approach to reconciling climate change and 
agriculture and moves towards the ‘transformation’ of food and agriculture along neoliberal 
lines described in the next section.  
 
Secondly, we engage with work on the ‘politics of translation’ (Newell 2008) and the 
domestication of global commitments to sustainable development across multiple governance 
scales. This work builds on rich literatures in GEPs on the domestication of global 
commitments at national level (Schreurs and Economy 1997), as well as on the interplay 
between the local and global governance of the commons (Agrawal 2012). Here the term 
‘polycentric governance’ has been used to describe how a given policy or intervention blends 
together actors from different scales of implementation which fuse the agency and funds of 
public and actors (Sovacool et al 2017; Cole 2015). Interventions around CSA provide a clear 
illustration of how a global concept travels across governance scales and is altered by so doing, 
mediated and refracted through national and sub-national institutions and political cultures 
where there is scope for agency on the part of national and local elites to re-work global agendas 
to their advantage and in line with domestic priorities.  
 
Thirdly, by emphasizing the politics and power relations which run through this process, the 
article strengthens insights from the application of global political ecology to GEPs (Newell 
and Bumpus 2012; Sovacool et al 2017) and of political ecology and political economy to 
climate change adaptation in particular (Taylor 2015; Sovacool and Linnér 2016) and ‘climate 
resilient’ and ‘climate compatible development’ in general (Rai and Fisher 2016; Nunan 2017). 
We highlight the value of political ecology approaches which ‘situate local processes within a 
multi-scalar series of causal forces’ (Taylor 2015, 5). Our analysis affirms the finding in this 
literature that local actors can, at times, navigate spaces of contestation to govern resources, 
advance rights and access claims in ways which align with their priorities in spite of national, 
regional and global disciplinary pressures to pursue a preferred pathway. This reveals the more 
unruly and political nature of negotiations around SDG implementation than suggested by the 
de-politicizing language of synergy and consensus. In this sense our argument reinforces that 
of Taylor that the consequence of the ‘biopolitical impetus to make climate change 
governable...lends itself to a technocratic politics that seeks to contain the perceived threats 
posed by climate change within existing institutional parameters’ (2015, xii).  
 
Finally, taking the case of Kenya, we draw on insights from the political economy of 
development to show that the ways in which trade-offs between SDGs are resolved is a function 
of factors such as a country’s location in the global political economy (level of aid dependence 
and flows of FDI for example) and how much policy autonomy exists to address the tensions 
inherent in the SDGs in ways which accord with domestic priorities rather than the preferences 
of donors and transnational agribusiness actors (Gallagher 2005). Different national policy 
processes structure the possibilities and openings for global governance actors to shape 
priorities and implement projects. Where they are heavily aid dependent and tied to the agendas 
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of development banks, it becomes easier to understand how the predominance of market liberal 
framings that we observe globally gets replicated regional and nationally through CAADP and 
national CSA strategies.  
 
Food and Agriculture in a Warming World 
 
From SDGs to CSA 
 
Fifteen years after the launch of the Millennium Development Goals, the international 
community announced the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, distinguishable by their focus 
on sustainability and the agreement that the goals would be universally applied by member 
countries. Perhaps most notably, the SDGs are novel because of the extent to which the goals 
are framed as ‘integrated and indivisible’ (United Nations, 2015), breaking down the 
traditionally siloed approach. Consequently, whilst there has been growing emphasis on 
‘synergies’ and ‘nexuses’, the SDGs serve as a watershed for the significance of this approach. 
However, meeting these goals simultaneously brings into sharp relief the trade-offs between 
them and presents potentially unprecedented challenges for governments in terms of how to 
design policies and processes that afford a holistic view of their interaction and impact on other 
resource areas. As Biermann et al put it; ‘While the SDGs hold a great potential, their collective 
success will depend on a number of institutional factors such as the extent to which states …. 
strengthen related global governance arrangements, translate the global ambitions into national 
contexts, integrate sectoral policies, and maintain flexibility in governance mechanisms’ (2017, 
26). Moreover, the capacity of states to implement global goals in response to interconnected 
global crises such as that around food and energy is further called into question by Sexsmith 
and McMichael, who point to ‘an epistemic blind spot that foregoes an opportunity to reorient 
planning to accommodate the global dimensions of these crises’ (2015, 581). 
 
Indeed, despite the compelling nature of synergy and nexus thinking, a number of scholars 
have sought to caution the effectiveness of such approaches. Cairns and Krzywoszynska (2016) 
have argued that the nexus has become a new buzzword, combining ambiguity of meaning with 
strong normative resonance to express an ‘integrative imaginary’, whilst assuming that policy 
integration is both desirable and possible. In relation to CSA, there is similar concern that the 
‘triple-win’ rhetoric serves to downplay the conflicts between competing policy objectives, and 
obscures the contradictions and challenges associated with them (Newell and Taylor 2017). 
Furthermore, as Weitz et al argue, while  the water, energy and food nexus literature identifies 
barriers to achieving coherence, it ‘does not clearly explain why the barriers are present, what 
influences them, and how they can be acted upon. These gaps disconnect the nexus literature 
from the governance processes it ultimately seeks to influence’ (2017, 165). Our contribution 
supports the work of those scholars who suggest that the key barriers to policy coherence 
include the unequal distribution of power, voice, access to information, resources and 
capability amongst actors and institutions which inevitably derive from a political process of 
negotiation among unequal partners (Allouche et al 2014). By looking at these dynamics across 
scales, we challenge the way in which the ‘non-linearity and complexity of governance and 
decision-making... tends to be ignored’ (Weitz 2017, 166). 
 
CSA: Emergence and Debates 
 
CSA, which was first articulated in 2009 in an FAO publication (Mann et al 2009), emerged 
as a way to square the goals of climate change mitigation and adaptation with the need to 
increase productivity in the agricultural sector through the promise of a ‘triple-win solution’. 
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It is not hard to understand why this is thought to be necessary. Agriculture is directly reliant 
on natural resources and the climate, consuming some 70 percent of global freshwater and 
occupying 40 percent of global land area (Braimoh 2013). However, it is amongst the most 
significant contributors to climate change, accounting for 56 percent of global non-CO2 
greenhouse gas emissions through the production of methane and nitrous oxide (Vermeulen et 
al 2012). Globally 2.5 billion people depend upon agriculture for their livelihood (FAO 2013b), 
and it is a mainstay of employment in Sub-Saharan African countries such as Kenya, employing 
more than 80 percent of the rural workforce, yet is also one of the sectors most vulnerable to 
the effects of climate change (World Bank and CIAT 2015). Given the importance and 
vulnerability of water and energy inputs in food production, attempts to deliver CSA in practice 
afford useful insights into the governance of the nexus around WEF and the ways in which 
trade-offs relating to the relevant SDGs are handled or not. 
 
The CSA paradigm has gained such momentum that it is seen to have become the key concept 
for organizations working at the nexus of climate change, agriculture and development (Taylor 
2017). Despite the undoubted value of trying to locate projects which help to reduce rural 
poverty and do so in a way which is less carbon intensive and more resilient to the effects of 
climate change, the paradigm of CSA has received significant critique. For example, it is 
ambiguous when it comes to specifying particular techniques for sustainable agriculture, 
despite claims that it constitutes ‘a new approach… to guide the needed changes of agricultural 
systems’ (FAO 2013, 27). CSA serves as a broad discursive umbrella to accommodate differing 
agendas, aligning itself broadly with pre-existing approaches such as sustainable intensification 
and agroecology by emphasizing their shared goal of integrating climate change imperatives 
with agricultural productivity, whilst obscuring their substantive differences (Newell and 
Taylor, 2017). It has also been critiqued for failing to adequately recognize trade-offs. The 
three pillars of CSA (adaptation, mitigation and increasing productivity) are very loosely 
defined, and there are no set metrics for monitoring progress in any of these domains. 
Consequently, mitigation can be defined in CSA variously as total GHG emissions reductions, 
or as GHG intensity reductions, and in some iterations of the concept is described merely as a 
co-benefit to be addressed ‘where possible’ (FAO 2013). For critics, this ambiguity allows 
agribusiness interests to ‘greenwash’ technologies and tools such as genetic engineering, 
biochar and biofuels as being climate-compatible (GRAIN, 2015).  
The Global and Regional Landscape of CSA: Horizontal Governance of Climate and 
Agriculture  
 
The regime complex for climate change and agriculture provides a point of departure for 
understanding the ‘horizontal’ flows of power between global governance institutions and the 
inequities and imbalances between them. The CSA regime complex spans multiple governance 
actors, ranging from the UN climate regime to multilateral environmental organizations such 
as the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) research 
consortium and civil society organizations (Newell and Taylor 2017). The complex is also 
notable for the extent to which it incorporates organizations who are critical of some framings 
of CSA – without wielding sufficient power to challenge the dominant discourse coalition. This 
diversity amongst the complex is key to its ability to accommodate criticism and bolster its 
legitimacy by building consensus and stability for dominant framings.  
 
In analyzing the distribution of power between actors, it is clear that the FAO, World Bank and 
CGIAR are the most significant institutions when it comes to advancing policies and 
influencing the debate on CSA. For example, the FAO founded three of the landmark programs 
7 
for advancing CSA; Mitigation of Climate Change in Agriculture (MICCA), Economics and 
Policy Innovations for CSA (EPIC) and the most well-known, the Global Alliance for Climate 
Smart Agriculture (GACSA). These programs are also heavily underpinned by other UN 
institutions such as the UNDP, while the most recent UNFCCC CoP 22 in Marrakech served 
as a showcase for the newfound profile of agriculture as a critical site for the adaptation to, and 
mitigation of, climate change. Throughout, one of the key vehicles for the promotion of this 
work is the CGIAR and its numerous partner research centers, as well as its research program 
focusing on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food security (CCAFS). Through these means, 
the UN institutions and CGIAR affiliated research bodies make up a closely connected network 
of actors and institutions who exert significant influence over the climate change and 
agriculture research agenda.  
 
This is not to suggest, however, that this dominant framing of CSA is uncontested. Different 
degrees of emphasis are placed on the role of the private sector between the GACSA program 
of the FAO and the ‘4 par 1000’ soil carbon sequestration program launched at CoP 22 by the 
French Government, for example. There have also been responses to a number of the early 
critiques of the CSA approach such as increasing the attention paid to the equity and gender 
inclusion components of CSA (Collins 2017) and the CCAFS Phase II programmatic structure  
devotes two additional ‘learning platforms’ to addressing ‘CSA, gender and social inclusion’ 
(CCAFS 2016). Moreover, CCAFS appears to be shifting away from the maxim of ‘triple win’ 
to a more flexible and holistic approach which seeks to build on synergies and co-benefits 
wherever possible, but which is notably less simplistic. This is exemplified in recent 
publications led by CCAFS authors who acknowledge that ‘It is very unlikely that there are 
silver bullets that can deliver “climate smartness” in all contexts…’ (Thornton et al 2017, 149), 
whilst a CCAFS representative in an open forum acknowledged that ‘triple wins are not always 
possible, two is enough, three is great’.1  
 
These attempts to accommodate critique provide insights into how the CSA regime complex 
legitimates itself and retains an underlying purpose despite the fragmentation between actors. 
In particular, the ‘clever ambiguity’ of the particular definitions and metrics of CSA (Lilliston 
2015) and the limited evaluations of projects to date (Arakelyan et al 2017) smooth over the 
fractures and disparate interpretations between institutions, and hold together the loose 
coalition behind CSA. Thus, despite these adjustments in rhetoric, a very broad consensus 
remains around climate-proofing existing agricultural strategies and expanding the 
development and uptake of practices labelled as ‘climate-smart’. The enabling environments 
to support these interventions are those consistent with the further commercialization of 
agriculture, such that any indictment climate change poses of the agro-industrial system 
disappears from view. As Taylor observes (2015, 99), ‘for the institutions of global governance, 
climate change simply confirms what they already knew. Agriculture in the developing world 
needs to become more intensive, efficient and technologically advanced. To do so, it needs 
better integration into internationalized circuits of commodity exchange’. As successive World 
Bank (2007; 2009) and International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD) reports 
make clear (2010), climate resilient agriculture is to be achieved through ‘sustainable 
intensification’, market expansion and livelihood diversification. Therefore, structurally, the 
power across the regime complex continues to reside with major institutional actors, bilateral 
and multilateral funding organizations responsible for financing CSA, and the private sector 
because of their required buy into the approach.  
 
                                                     
1 Interview with CCAFS representative. 
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Regional Governance 
 
At the regional level in Africa another set of actors play a key role in advocating some 
agricultural pathways over others. Framings of the need to ‘modernize’ and industrialize 
African agriculture and to ‘scale-up agro-based industry and commerce’ run through policy 
documents and reports of regional actors such as New Economic Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) and CAADP that play a significant part in guiding national agricultural 
strategies. They are replete with calls for neoliberal modes of governance such as Public-
Private (and private-private) Partnerships (PPPs) and the need for positive ‘enabling 
environments for the private sector’ to unlock ‘transformations’ and ‘revolutions’ in African 
agriculture (African Union Commission, 2015). The African Union’s Malabo Declaration on 
Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved 
Livelihoods, for example, calls for a doubling of productivity (focusing on inputs, irrigation 
and mechanization). Demands for ‘sustainable intensification’, agricultural growth corridors 
and for the ‘transition into modern family farms’ in which resources will be used more 
efficiently through ‘economies of scale’ take their cue from the World Bank’s emphasis on 
integrating smallholders into global agro-food commodity chains (World Bank 2007) in order 
to ‘deepen the commercialization of agricultural production, facilitate more market 
opportunities for producers and allow them to better access investment and technology’ (Taylor 
2015, 102-3). National Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plans meanwhile, are the 
vehicles for aligning implementation and mobilizing financing which are then reviewed 
regionally for compliance. Locking in state compliance is both necessary and consistent with 
the World Bank’s view that the state ‘corrects market failures, regulates competition and 
engages strategically in public-private partnerships to promote competitiveness in the 
agribusiness sector and support the inclusion of smallholders and rural workers’ (2007, 8).  
 
Regional institutions in this regard become important conveyor belts for providing buy-in for 
the framings of market liberal global governance institutions. For example, one of the strategic 
action areas of CAADP focuses on ‘Market infrastructure, regional trade and integration and 
value chains development’, while another relates to enhancing ‘innovative financing models 
for increased public and private sector finance for agricultural investments along the value 
chain’. The need to domesticate global trade disciplines is explicit in the call to ‘harmonize 
trade regimes, measures and standards, and remove non-tariff barriers within and across 
regional trade blocs and domesticate and implement regional and continental trade agreements 
at national level’. In the latter regard a ‘Continental Free Trade Area’ is envisaged. 
Harmonization is considered to be key because ‘Inconsistent or non-supportive agricultural 
policies at continental, regional and national levels stagnates the pace of transformation’. While 
a NSA (Non-State Actor) coalition has been formed in 2014 to participate in the CAADP 
process involving farmers’ organizations, civil society and grassroots movements alongside 
business and private sector actors, their role is narrowly confined to ‘advocating for best 
practices’ and to ‘effectively engage the private sector as a critical partner in transforming 
African agriculture through policy and institutional reforms that encourage and support private 
investments in agricultural value chains’ (African Union Commission 2015).2      
 
This chimes with other interventions and initiatives within the region such as the ‘New 
Alliance’, ‘Grow Africa’, and ‘Green Revolution for Africa’ which seek dramatic shifts in 
production, technology and financing that have an explicit preference for market-led 
                                                     
2 For a more critical civil society perspective from African civil society see the ‘Statement of the 
African and U.S. Food Sovereignty Summit’ Seattle, Washington October 13, 2014. 
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agricultural development, where the diagnosis of the problem of African agriculture is a deficit 
of private capital, conducive regulatory and legal frameworks and investment in research and 
infrastructures of interest to investors. These are assumed under the a priori goals of 
accelerating export-led growth through agreed commitments to increased expenditure, new 
infrastructures and constructing agricultural growth corridors noted above. While the World 
Bank, FAO and USAID have actively supported CSA in national level strategies in Rwanda, 
Kenya and Tanzania, there is little mention of climate change under the CAADP themes 
(Morton 2017). Regarding the implications in terms of energy and water inputs of the imagined 
leaps in productivity and through ‘sustainable intensification’ and what this means for ability 
to deliver on SDGs, there is a deafening silence. What this is likely to mean for simultaneous 
expectations to improve land tenure security and access to water and energy for the poor is, 
unsurprisingly, not made clear. The consequence of this is that the way in which the overriding 
significance of agriculture is reduced to its ability to accelerate growth forms a meta-narrative 
from key global and regional policy actors that inevitably skews any serious balancing of this 
objective with concerns for the social and environmental sustainability of the new pathways 
imagined for African agriculture.  
 
Governing Climate Smart Agriculture in Practice: Insights from Kenya 
 
Governing CSA in practice is characterized by multi-scalar power dynamics and tensions as 
policy is translated from the international and regional to the national and sub-national level. 
This is further complicated in the case of Kenya by political devolution and tension between 
national and county governments. Here we advance several arguments by ‘following the 
policy’ of CSA from the global to the local, tracing how CSA is domesticated and how 
international donor agendas are ‘translated’ in a domestic context. 
   
One of the most significant factors influencing the domestication of international policy for an 
aid-dependent country such as Kenya is donor pressure. Two interrelated issues emerge here: 
firstly, how this finance shapes turf wars in response to funding opportunities, and secondly 
how this can shape policy itself. Because CSA is associated with major streams of finance for 
climate change mitigation, adaptation and carbon sequestration, it incentivizes organizations 
to position themselves to benefit from these new resource flows. In the Kenyan climate change 
and agricultural policy context, this is exemplified by Maina et al who argue that donor funding 
has influenced local priorities: ‘…with the potential for existing ODA funds to be relabeled as 
climate funds (rather than as additional sources of finance), an understandable and indeed 
necessary response is for some actors to position themselves as worthy recipients’ (2013, 15).  
 
Yet the disconnect between international policy rhetoric around synergy and ‘triple wins’ and 
how policy is being implemented by policymakers is very clear. Whilst pre-existing agriculture 
and climate change policies are increasingly being re-labelled as ‘climate smart’ at a national 
level, when it comes to implementation they are referred to simply as ‘best practice’. Many 
interview participants noted that the original CSA paradigm of ‘triple win’ as defined by the 
FAO (2013) has very little resonance with their approaches. For example, researchers at a 
national agricultural research organization acknowledged that they have been ‘doing resilience 
work for many years – the challenge is in the issue of narrative…. If you get the narrative right 
then you’re speaking the same language’, whilst a Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) official noted 
that; ‘CSA has become synonymous with best practice agricultural interventions…. Arguably 
every project in Kenya is climate linked and is therefore ‘climate smart’…Nowadays even the 
roads have to be ‘climate smart!’  
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Despite the power of donor framings, in the case of CSA in Kenya the government has been 
able to carve out a policy space to domesticate the concept of CSA in its own way. CSA is not 
interpreted homogeneously across scales and different contexts. As it moves further from the 
scientific and technical lens of the FAO (Chandra at el 2017) there is a much broader 
interpretation of the meanings of CSA. Beyond the re-labelling of a variety of resilience and 
adaptation initiatives as ‘climate-smart’, the Government’s ‘Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture 
Strategy’ re-frames the goals of CSA in the Kenyan context as; i) adaptation and building 
resilience; ii) mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions; iii) enabling policy, legal and 
institutional frameworks and iv) addressing cross-cutting issues that adversely impact CSA 
(Government of Kenya 2017, 23) – goals which break away from the core ‘triple win’ of the 
original CSA definition. Here, the ambiguity of CSA facilitates the re-labelling of pre-existing 
activities as ‘climate-smart’ by the Kenyan MoA and other policymakers to better suit the 
domestic context. In particular, the Kenyan CSA Strategy highlights both the institutional 
capacity needed to tackle synergies across the climate change and agriculture nexus, noting the 
‘Inadequate CSA knowledge management system to collect, store, process and disseminate 
developed knowledge’ (Kenya CSA Strategy 2017, 45), as well as being cognizant of broader 
development priorities. In this way, the Kenyan MoA uses CSA as a platform from which to 
identify and build exactly the sort of holistic approach that the original CSA approach had been 
criticized for lacking. 
  
Turning to policy implementation, it is clear that complex inter-organizational and ministerial 
power dynamics characterize the policy landscape in Kenya, and that the challenge of making 
‘climate smart’ agricultural policy is testing existing institutional structures and mandates. 
Indeed, ‘Inadequate structures in Intergovernmental relations for implementation of CSA 
related policies and legislations’ and ‘Weak inter-and intragovernmental linkages and among 
other organizations’ (2017, 40) are highlighted in the Kenya CSA Strategy as potential threats 
to the successful implementation of CSA. The key policy actors in the climate change and 
agriculture field in Kenya are the Deputy President’s Office, and the climate change secretariat 
in the Ministry of the Environment (MoE), as well as the Ministries of Finance, Planning and 
Devolution and of Agriculture. Stakeholder interviews revealed that the Deputy President’s 
Office is seen to have both the greatest interest in climate change and the ability to mobilize 
resources. The MoE has the technocrats and expertise, whilst the Ministry of Finance manages 
both national and bilateral funds. However, overall it is felt that the most significant actor is 
the Office of the Deputy President; as one interviewee put it, ‘when all said and done, the Office 
of the President is key here.’ What results is a disconnect between climate policy and 
agricultural policy and a siloed working style between Ministries working in this area 
(Germanwatch 2012, 3), a trend which resonates with Morton’s analysis of three other African 
countries where ‘agricultural stakeholders have limited participation in national climate policy 
processes dominated by environment ministries and agricultural policies may not give adequate 
priority to … climate change’ (2017, 106). 
  
Devolution also plays a key role in influencing the Kenyan policy landscape following the 
introduction of a new constitution in 2010. Although government ministries have the 
responsibility to set the policy agenda in relation to CSA, agricultural policy is an issue 
devolved to county level. Because of this, the ministries at a national level carry no 
responsibility for implementing CSA, and are solely responsible for developing policy and 
strategy, such as the Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy (Government of Kenya 2017). 
CSA projects fall to the county level where they are implemented through County Integrated 
Development Plans. Because of this, the national government does not have to reconcile the 
‘triple wins’ of CSA, nor deal with the inconsistencies and disconnects between regional and 
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international policy, and in many ways can ‘pass the baton’ of mediating between competing 
policy goals. As one ministry official put it; ‘We cannot direct how counties respond (to our 
policies)’. The impact is that the hard choices of reconciling the ‘triple wins’ of CSA are being 
passed down to a more local level, where more context specific choices can be made, but where 
there is less technical and administrative capacity. Moreover, given the geographic, ecological 
and economic variations across counties in Kenya, devolving all decision making to a local 
level potentially hinders the ability to balance synergies or trade-offs across the agricultural 
sector nationally. As Scott notes reflecting on the context in Kenya and elsewhere, ‘Even when 
many responsibilities have been devolved from central government, imbalances in power and 
resources between central and local government could mean that strong coordination leads to 
more decision-making at the centre’ (2017, 13). 
 
Finally, the fragmentation inherent to the county system can also complicate negotiations with 
external donors and policy implementation where the global and local interact, requiring 
mediation by national or regional institutions. For example, one of the flagship CSA projects 
in Kenya is the World Bank funded Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Project, which will 
provide $250 million USD to a variety of climate change and agriculture initiatives broadly 
described as CSA (World Bank 2017). According to one interviewee, the county system made 
the negotiations for this project fraught with difficulty, due to competing demands for 
additional funding; ‘county governors demanded they get their extension and upscaling 
funds… the World Bank were not amused because people were behaving like this is a country 
within a country.’ The resulting funding allocations in the Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture 
Project demonstrate the perceived need to build institutional capacity at a county level; 
providing $24 million USD to ‘Building Institutional Capacity and Strengthening Service 
Delivery’ (World Bank 2017, 8), and responding to concerns noted above from the Kenyan 
MoA and others about the capacity of counties to implement such policies.  
 
What the Kenya case reveals then is how global and regional imperatives get re-worked 
through intra-state competition between competing state agencies and their preferred visions 
of CSA where there is scope to exercise autonomy in articulating a vision of CSA which departs 
from the dominant interpretations of international organizations such as FAO. The trade-offs 
that are necessarily implied when seeking to implement CSA projects and broader SDGs are 
brought into acute relief at county level and below where devolution intensifies struggles over 
resources and authority. Understanding and accounting for these dynamics is critical to 
evaluating how countries will address the challenge of realizing the ambition of the SDGs in 
practice.   
Conclusions 
 
We have sought to document and account for the ways in which global systems of food and 
agriculture and their interrelationship with the climate system are being governed across scales. 
Drawing on evidence from Kenya, we explored how the power dynamics which shape the 
governance of trade-offs between competing policy goals around climate change and 
agriculture play out in a particular regional, and then national and local context. Combining 
analysis of both the horizontal relationships of power that operate among and between global 
institutions active in this area, including the World Bank and the FAO most prominently, as 
well as the vertical relationships of power between global and regional actors and those national 
governments and counties that are home to ‘climate-smart’ agricultural projects and programs, 
we were able to explain the patterns of governance that we observe. We have seen how 
responsibility for delivering the SDGs simultaneously, and for resolving the trade-offs among 
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them, is globally diffused and often obscured behind the rhetoric of ‘triple-win’ in relation to 
CSA, but ultimately lands in particular local contexts in the global South where concrete 
choices have to be made about which agricultural pathway to choose and how far it is ‘climate 
compatible’.  
 
We noted in particular the ways in which dominant framings serve to read climate change not 
as an indictment of agro-industrialism, but as both a potential barrier to accumulation by raising 
the costs of some pathways and technologies, and also an opportunity to generate new sites of 
accumulation through the re-labelling and promotion of modern agricultural technologies and 
market-led trajectories as ‘climate smart’. As Taylor notes (2015, 104); ‘The spectre of climate 
change is inserted into this vision not as a challenge to its embedded assumptions but as a 
confirmation of its existing biases’. There is resistance to this framing by other global actors, 
NGOs and social movements and by skeptical governments who seek to re-work mantras about 
CSA in ways which align with national priorities and preferences and alternative visions of 
agricultural development. Without diminishing the material power of donors and multilateral 
and regional development banks and agencies which circumscribes the ‘developmental space’ 
of governments in Africa, the relationship is not a one-way imposition, but rather a negotiation 
between unequal partners. Even the best resourced and most vociferously promoted global 
interventions look different once ‘translated’ into diverse domestic political and economic 
settings and refracted through local institutional processes where triple wins do not always 
resonate with local contexts. Moreover, the very ambiguity of CSA which makes it attractive 
for CSR purposes, also allows local development actors to play the discursive game by 
labelling their own preferred interventions ‘climate-smart’.    
  
Theoretically, this suggests the need for scholars of GEPs to engage in multi-level analysis to 
understand how power dynamics operate across scales, not in linear and uniform ways, but 
mediated by the nature of institutions and the material and discursive practices of power, 
employing insights from global political ecology which have been used to understand macro-
macro power dynamics linking global environmental politics to local outcomes. 
Methodologically and analytically, this highlights the need to find ways of understanding and 
tracing ‘up and down’ the consequences of decision-making in GEPs, in this case around CSA 
and the climate-agriculture regime complex, for particular regions and groups of people. Rather 
than leave our analysis at the international level, the challenge is to read and locate the global 
locally and vice versa.  
 
‘Following the policy’ in this way also provides a more contextualized and nuanced account 
of how and why countries take up global initiatives: which features of their institutions and 
political economies make them more likely to do so and more or less vulnerable to pressure 
from global governance actors. In understanding these interactions, we drew on ideas about 
policy autonomy. Our analysis further suggests the need to not take dominant framings of 
issues as given. The reality of how different regions and social groups deal with these 
challenges on the ground is often very different from the way projects are imagined, and 
discursively constructed by donors and MDBs. ‘Triple wins’ often disguise complex trade-offs 
around the simultaneous pursuit of policy objectives around food and agriculture, water and 
energy. Site specific research helps to challenge the articulation of policy orthodoxies and 
points to the need for scholars of GEPs to do more of this work, alongside studying what global 
institutions do, and claim to be doing as an end in and of itself. 
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